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I. INTRODUCTION
From toothpaste to toilet paper, chemicals play an integral role in
producing essential everyday items.1 Though many chemicals are harmless
and beneficial, poor management of hazardous chemicals can devastate the
environment and jeopardize health.2 In 2006, the European Union (EU)
passed sweeping chemical legislation to protect human health and the
environment through the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and
Restriction of Chemicals Regulation (REACH).3 However, the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) trade negotiations between the
United States and EU could threaten REACH’s future effectiveness.4 TTIP
is a proposed free trade agreement between the U.S. and the EU to further
open the market between the world’s two largest economies.5 By further
synchronizing and liberalizing the economic relationship between the EU
and the U.S., trade representatives predict TTIP will increase wealth and
create jobs.6
However, these economic pursuits could result in
environmental degradation.7
Environmentalists fear that TTIP could
undermine the EU’s stringent environmental laws—particularly the recently
enacted REACH.8
1 Julie Gerstein, The Truth About Natural Toothpaste, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING (Mar. 8,
2010), http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/health/womens-health/natural-toothpaste-ingredien
ts-0307; Jennifer Grayson, Eco Etiquette: Is My Toilet Paper Toxic?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec.
12, 2011, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jennifer-grayson/eco-etiquette-is-my-toi
le_b_1008317.html.
2 Chemicals in Our Waters Are Affecting Humans and Aquatic Life in Unanticipated Ways,
SCI. DAILY (Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/02/080216095740.
htm (discussing the contamination of waters and marine animals due to the release and
accumulation of commercial chemicals).
3 Commission Regulation 1907/2006, Registration, Authorisation and Restriction of
Chemicals (REACH), 2006 O.J. (L 396) 6 [hereinafter REACH].
4 See Brian Flood, U.S.–EU Trade Agreement Could Result in Dangerous Deregulation,
NGOs Say, 36 INT’L ENV’T REP. 1003 (July 17, 2013).
5
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), ATLANTIC COUNCIL (June 21,
2013), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/in-the-news/transatlantic-trade-and-investment-pa
rtnership-ttip.
6
Fact Sheet: United States to Negotiate Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
with the European Union, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Feb. 13, 2013), https://
ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2013/february/US-EU-TTIP [hereinafter
TTIP Fact Sheet].
7
Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, “To Dream the Impossible Dream”: Globalization and
Harmonization of Environmental Laws, 20 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 205, 210 (1995).
8
SIERRA CLUB, THE TRANSATLANTIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: WHAT’S AT STAKE FOR
COMMUNITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13–14 (2013), available at http://action.sierraclub.org/
site/DocServer/TTIP_Report.pdf?docID=13541.
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Ironically, some economists share the environmentalists’ uneasiness
regarding TTIP’s effect on REACH because friction between national
domestic regulations can compromise the success of a free trade agreement.9
Though multiple U.S. and EU regulations conflict, this Note focuses on the
conflict between the two chemical regulatory systems and urges that the two
chemical regulatory systems should be harmonized.10 Harmonization is a
process in which countries seek to unify conflicting laws to ease trade
burdens. This Note argues that the United States and European Union should
harmonize “upward,” meaning that the United States should adopt chemical
regulations matching the European Union’s REACH program. Upward
harmonization would accomplish TTIP’s economic goals by eliminating
regulatory gaps that impede free trade.11 Upward harmonization would also
strengthen the weak chemical regulatory system established by the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA) in the United States.12
Part II will first examine the conflict between environmental law and
international trade law. Part III will discuss the negotiation that led up to the
TIPP Agreement. Part IV engages in a comparative analysis of REACH and
TSCA. Part V examines the legality of the REACH program through the
lens of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the international organization
governing trade relations between countries. Finally, Part V explores various
forms of regulatory harmonization and proposes full upward harmonization
between REACH and TSCA.
In sum, this Note takes the position that the United States should
harmonize its chemical regulations upward by enacting new legislation to
update the outdated TSCA.13 Upward harmonization can close the chemical
regulatory gap between the U.S. and the EU and begin bridging the
traditional gap between environmental law and international trade.14
9
Bernabe-Riefkohl, supra note 7, at 212 (discussing the incompatibility between divergent
national regulations and international economic development).
10
See SIERRA CLUB, supra note 8, at 6 (also proposing regulatory harmonization between
divergent U.S. and EU regulatory systems to preserve and enhance environmental protection).
11
Alexander M. Donahue, Equivalence: Not Quite Close Enough for the International
Harmonization of Environmental Standards, 30 ENVTL. L. 363, 365 (2000) (stating that
“[s]tandards disparities obstruct imports and exports, create inefficiencies, and increase costs
for international business, which in turn impedes international trade and slows the global train
of prosperity”).
12
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (1976) [hereinafter TSCA].
13
See James T. O’Reilly, Torture by TSCA: Retrospectives of a Failed Statute, 25 NAT.
RES. & ENV’T 43, 43 (2010) (“TSCA has failed us and left us with a mere façade of effective
environmental action.”).
14
Matthew Tuchband, Note, The Systemic Environmental Externalities of Free Trade: A
Call for Wiser Trade Decisionmaking, 83 GEO. L.J. 2099, 2099 (1995) (suggesting that a gap
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II. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FRICTION
While the conflict between international trade and environmental law is
not necessarily intuitive, it certainly exists.15 Environmentalists believe that
because the free market fosters price competition, industry naturally flocks to
areas where production is cheapest.16 Because environmental regulation is
usually expensive, production tends to be cheapest in areas with fewer
environmental regulations.17
Therefore, governments may lower
environmental standards to attract industry.18
Conversely, trade advocates argue that industry flocks to areas of
advanced technology.19 Further, economic growth spurred by free trade
gives industry more resources to develop better environmental controls and
technology.20 Clearly, no simple way to reconcile the two positions exists.
Nevertheless, closely examining the interaction between international trade
and environment law better shapes the debate and can identify the core of the
conflict.
One solid starting point for examining the relationship between
international trade and environmental law is through various provisions of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the multilateral
agreement governing international trade in goods.21 For example, the GATT
contains an anti-discrimination provision called “National Treatment” in
Article II but carves out environmental exceptions to this rule in Article
XX.22 The National Treatment principle states that WTO member countries
cannot treat domestically produced goods more favorably than similar goods
imported from foreign countries.23 GATT Article XX contains exceptions to
the National Treatment provision for the preservation of human, animal, or
between environmental law and international trade exists because “[i]n much of the
environmental community, trade is seen as antithetical to environmental protection”).
15 See Hajin Kim, Do Trade Liberalization and International Trade Law Constrain
Domestic Environmental Regulation?, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10823, 10823−25
(2013) (discussing the traditional arguments used by environmentalists and free trade
enthusiasts that domestic environmental laws weaken international free trade and vice versa).
16 Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness, and Harmonization:
Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 271
(1997).
17
See Kim, supra note 15, at 10823.
18
Id. at 10824.
19
Id. at 10823.
20
Id. at 10824.
21
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
22
Id. arts. III, XX.
23
Id. art. III(1)–(2).
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plant life or health, and the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, but
only when these measures do not unnecessarily hinder trade.24 The
interaction between these rules illustrates a presumption underlying the
international trade system: countries will use various domestic policies—one
of which is environmental regulation—to protect their domestic industries
from foreign competition.25 Noting this seemingly hostile approach to
environmental regulations, legal scholars have long lamented that
environmental protection was being sacrificed for economic interests at an
alarming rate.26
As mentioned above, the emphasis of price competition in capitalist
societies contributes to the conflict between environmental regulations and
economic policies.27 Companies operating in areas with weak environmental
rules can generally sell goods at lower prices than companies operating in
areas with strong environmental laws.28 As a result, companies have an
incentive to operate in areas with less stringent environmental regulations to
create a higher profit margin.29 Exacerbating the problem, the high cost of
controlling environmental harms conflicts with the goals of cutting costs and
producing competitively priced goods.30
Furthermore, dispute resolution systems at the WTO and within regional
trade agreements can impose large penalties for restricting imports to comply
with environmental laws.31 These mechanisms may incentivize countries to
under-enforce domestic environmental laws or never enact them at all if
those laws restrict importation.32

24

Id. art. XX(b), (g).
Ari Afilalo & Sheila Foster, The World Trade Organization’s Anti-Discrimination
Jurisprudence: Free Trade, National Sovereignty, and Environmental Health in the Balance,
15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 633, 652 (2003) (noting that the broad goals of the GATT and
disputes involving National Treatment claims are associated with “rooting out
protectionism”).
26
Robert F. Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke, Making Trade and Environmental Policies
Mutually Reinforcing: Forging Competitive Sustainability, 23 ENVTL. L. 545, 547 (1993).
27
See Esty & Geradin, supra note 16, at 271 (discussing the proposition that countries
compete with one another to produce cheaper goods and that stringent environmental
regulations raise the price of production).
28 Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
See J. Carol Williams, The Next Frontier: Environmental Law in a Trade-Dominated
World, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 221, 232 (2001).
32
Id. at 222–25, 227 (discussing the dispute resolution mechanism in the NAFTA
Investment Chapter that allows private corporations to sue governments if they believe a
country’s environmental laws or regulations violate its rights under the free trade agreement,
25
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Similarly, broad societal values can push environmental and economic
goals in opposite directions and create disputes.33 For example, in an effort
to protect wildlife, the U.S. restricted imports of tuna caught by purse seine
fishing, a fishing method that can kill dolphins.34 Ultimately, one reason the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruled against the U.S. measure was because
it undermined economic goals.35 This decision left the U.S. to decide
whether to pay penalties for restricting trade and continue to protect animals,
or forego its environmental goals to promote trade in compliance with WTO
standards. While both free trade and environmental protection enhance
social well-being,36 they inevitably conflict because societies, like
individuals, have conflicting desires.37
Therefore, conflict between
environmental protection and free trade is common and often inevitable.38
III. THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP
President Obama announced in February 2013 that the U.S. would launch
negotiations with the EU on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP).39 The overarching goal of TTIP is to enhance economic
growth and create jobs by further expanding the economic relationship
between the U.S. and EU, which is already the largest in the world.40 The
United States Trade Representative Office’s (USTR) press release first
stressed the importance of the economic relationship between the U.S. and
the EU41 and then stressed the need to eliminate regulatory differences to cut
costs and promote trade.42 Thus, the U.S. appears to be following the
traditional model of the trade/environment debate by framing regulatory
as and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’s ability to quickly adopt binding reports that can
result in financial retaliation against a country with trade-restrictive environmental policies).
33 See generally Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 658, 674–76
(1996) (discussing the idea that free trade principles tend to overlook other important
noneconomic societal goals).
34
Afilalo & Foster, supra note 25, at 656.
35
Id. at 665.
36
Nita Ghei, Evaluating the WTO’s Two Step Test for Environmental Measures Under
Article XX, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 117, 119 (2007).
37
See Nichols, supra note 33, at 674.
38 Id.
39
TTIP Fact Sheet, supra note 6.
40
Id. (“The President’s decision recognizes that the U.S.-EU economic relationship is
already the world’s largest, accounting for one third of total goods and services trade and
nearly half of global economic output.”).
41
Id. (noting that the EU is the largest importer of U.S. goods at $465 billion and the U.S.EU investment relationship totals $4 trillion and contributes to over 9 million U.S. jobs).
42
Id.
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differences in terms of the economic bottom line. However, this Note posits
that the U.S. has an unprecedented opportunity to turn the trade/environment
conflict on its head. The U.S.’s goal of eliminating regulatory differences43
could also be accomplished through upward harmonization of environmental
regulatory standards to those of the EU level. Considering the Obama
Administration’s support for TSCA reform,44 TTIP could be the missing link
to remedying the shortcomings of TSCA while opening the market for
chemical trade with the EU in an environmentally responsible way. The
U.S.’s and EU’s opportunity to use economic goals to reinforce
environmental goals and vice versa is particularly unique in the context of
TTIP because bilateral trade agreements allow nations to set new standards
for unique areas such as the environment.45
A. State of Negotiations
So far, the USTR has outlined two major issues regarding upcoming TTIP
negotiations: eliminating nontariff barriers and reconciling regulatory
differences.46 First, leaders of the U.S. and the EU want to address trade
flow problems by reducing nontariff barriers.47 Whereas tariffs limit imports
by directly placing charges on the goods at customs, nontariff barriers
include nonmonetary measures that block trade, such as import quotas or
strict health standards.48 Consequently, domestic environmental laws can
also operate as nontariff barriers,49 making REACH susceptible to

43

Id.
Frances Beinecke, Great Opportunity to Protect American Families from Toxic
Chemicals, HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2010, 5:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fran
ces-beinecke/great-opportunity-to-prot_b_546333.html.
45
Pascal Lamy, Director-General, World Trade Organization, Speech at the Confederation of
Indian Industries Partnership Summit 2007: Emergent India: New Roles and Responsibilities
(Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e//sppl53_e.htm.
46
Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Transcript: Briefing by
USTR Ambassador Ron Kirk and Deputy National Security Advisor Michael Froman on USEU Trade Negotiations (Feb. 13, 2013, 9:45 AM), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pre
ss-office/press-releases/2013/february/transcript-briefing-us-eu [hereinafter Briefing on U.S.–
EU Trade Negotiations].
47
Id. (stating that “[t]he high-level working group recommended that the EU and the
United States . . . mak[e] substantial progress on tackling and reducing non-tariff areas and
addressing liberalization in areas of service investment, labor and the environment, among
other issues”).
48
Donahue, supra note 11, at 365.
49
JENNIFER L. MACHLIN & TOMME R. YOUNG, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK: REAL
ESTATE AND BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, § 12:16 (2012).
44
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elimination during negotiations if the U.S. considers REACH a nontariff
barrier.50
Early statements describing negotiations suggest that the U.S. and the EU
are approaching the issue from different angles. U.S. Trade Representative
Michael Froman stated that “our intent is to negotiate a comprehensive
agreement . . . [by] looking at the regulatory barriers and the barriers that our
different standards pose to further integration of our economy.”51 The
European Commission, on the other hand, stated that the EU will:
[N]ot negotiate existing levels of protection for the sake of an
agreement. [The EU’s] high level of protection . . . is nonnegotiable. . . The negotiations will not be about lowering
standards: they are about getting rid of tariffs and useless redtape while keeping high standards in place. There will be no
compromise whatsoever on safety, consumer protection or the
environment.52
Thus, while both governments are eager to expand and strengthen their
economies, environmental tensions are apparent from the outset.
B. Fundamental Differences Between U.S. and EU Environmental Law and
the Effect on TTIP Negotiations
The official statements produced above only scratch the surface of
environmental law and international trade tensions affecting TTIP
negotiations. First, the U.S. and the EU disagree on the appropriate theory
for approaching environmental regulation: the EU employs elements of the
Precautionary Principle into environmental regulations, while the U.S.
adheres more closely to a risk assessment approach.53 The Precautionary
50

SIERRA CLUB, supra note 8, at 13–14 (“The USTR has expressed a number of concerns
over the EU’s REACH program, signaling that chemical regulatory differences will be on the
TTIP negotiating table.”).
51 Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra note 46.
52
Press Release, European Commission, FAQ on the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (‘TTIP’) (June 17, 2013), available at http://trade.ed.europa.eu/docli
b/docs/2013/may/tradoc_151351.pdf.
53
Lawrence A. Kogan, What Goes Around Comes Around: How UNCLOS Ratification Will
Herald Europe’s Precautionary Principle as U.S. Law, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 23, 37
(2009) (“U.S. law has . . . employed mostly risk-based precaution, which more or less
balances environmental protection against other considerations, namely empirical risk
assessment and economic costs, while EU law, which employs hazard-based precaution, does
not.”); see generally Anne C. Dowling, Note, “Un-Locke-ing” a “Just Right” Environmental
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Principle adopts the position that a lack of solid scientific evidence about a
potential risk should not discourage preventative regulation.54 The U.S.’s
risk assessment approach relies more heavily upon clear scientific proof of
environmental dangers and economic cost-balancing before encouraging
regulation.55 Notably, the EU’s Precautionary Principle approach, expressed
in Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, takes
a more balanced approach by mixing elements of risk assessment into its
approach to the Precautionary Principle.56 Still, the EU approach is more
environmentally conscious than the U.S.’s risk assessment approach in
comparison.
The EU’s transparent incorporation of the principle of sustainability into
domestic EU law further illustrates differences between the U.S. and EU
environmental protection values. Article 2 of the European Community
Treaty includes environmental protection as a general objective and adopts
the principle of sustainable development in Article 6.57 While the U.S.
certainly enacts and enforces a wealth of extensive and comprehensive
environmental laws, it does not have comparable constitutional provisions or
federal laws with such general breadth.
Regime: Overcoming the Three Bears of International Environmentalism—Sovereignty,
Locke, and Compensation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 891 (2002) (describing
the history and development of U.S. environmental law).
54
See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz.,
June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) (declaring in Principle 15 that in the
event of “threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation”).
55
Kogan, supra note 53, at 37.
56 Summaries of EU Legislation: The Precautionary Principle, EUROPA, http://eur-lex.eur
opa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al32042 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (“The
precautionary principle shall be informed by three specific principles: [1] the fullest possible
scientific evaluation, the determination, as far as possible, of the degree of scientific
uncertainty; [2] a risk evaluation and an evaluation of the potential consequences of inaction;
[and] [3] the participation of all interested parties in the study of precautionary measures, once
the results of the scientific evaluation and/or the risk evaluation are available. In addition, the
general principles of risk management remain applicable when the precautionary principle is
invoked. These are the following five principles: [1] proportionality between the measures
taken and the chosen level of protection; [2] non-discrimination in application of the
measures; [3] consistency of the measures with similar measures already taken in similar
situations or using similar approaches; [4] examination of the benefits and costs of action or
lack of action; [and] [5] review of the measures in the light of scientific developments.”).
57
Beate Sjafjell, Internalizing Externalities in EU Law: Why Neither Corporate
Governance Nor Corporate Social Responsibility Provides the Answers, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 977, 978 (2009).
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Another distinction between U.S. and EU environmental law is a
temporal distinction. A large proportion of U.S. environmental law passed in
the 1970s as citizens became more aware of mounting environmental
degradation.58 Because Congress tends to move slowly when amending
existing legislation, alleged deficiencies have not been remedied efficiently
or quickly.59 On the other hand, EU environmental legislation such as
REACH is more recent and engineered to better tackle present-day
problems.60 A comparative analysis of TSCA and REACH more aptly
illustrates the general differences between the U.S.’s and EU’s
environmental law approaches and the more specific chemical regulatory
differences.
IV. REACH & TSCA: A COMPARISON
The framework of REACH highlights the shortcomings of the U.S.
chemical regulatory system, TSCA. This section will examine the
substantive and procedural provisions of REACH before examining TSCA to
illuminate those differences.
Ultimately, knowing these regulatory
differences can also inform and shape the harmonization discussion.
A. REACH
The basic structure of the regulation comes from REACH’s title:
Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction.61 Registration, the
first phase of REACH, demonstrates the unprecedented breadth of the
regulation because it applies to most existing and new chemicals produced or
imported in excess of one ton.62 Companies producing chemicals, using
chemicals in the production of other items, and companies importing or

58

Dowling, supra note 53, at 921–22.
See generally Michael G. Faure & Jason Scott Johnston, The Law and Economics of
Environmental Federalism: Europe and the United States Compared, 27 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 205,
212–14 (2009) (describing the onslaught of U.S. federal environmental law in the 1970s in
comparison with the EU’s difficulties enacting all-encompassing environmental law until after
1987 when “the EEC Treaty was revised to include provisions that specifically authorized the
EC to promulgate environmental directives”).
60
See O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 46 (suggesting that TSCA is inadequate because chemical
production and chemical exposure has changed since TSCA’s enactment).
61
John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practical Principles for Chemical
Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 742 (2008).
62
Id.
59
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exporting chemicals (or “articles”63 containing chemicals) in the requisite
amounts must register the chemicals with the European Chemicals Agency
(ECHA).64 The ECHA is a central, independent entity managing the
administration of REACH.65 During the Registration phase, chemical
manufacturers conduct tests and submit data to the ECHA regarding the
physical properties and inherent risks of the chemicals they manufacture or
import.66 This data “require[s] the production of basic toxicological data,
including studies of environmental toxicity . . . [and] chemical safety reports
that describe exposures and measures to reduce risks.”67 Further, REACH’s
testing requirements are the most stringent in the world, emphasizing the
potentially huge impact REACH could have on the global chemical
industry.68
During the “Evaluation” stage, the ECHA evaluates the information
gathered by industry to determine whether the chemical or the article
containing the chemical poses a threat to the environment.69 The criteria
used to make this determination include information regarding the hazardous
properties of the chemical, the chemical’s structural similarity to other
dangerous chemicals, how much of the chemical is produced, and the effects
of exposure to the chemical.70 If it determines that the chemical presents a
risk to the environment based on these criteria, the ECA categorizes the
chemical as a “substance of very high concern” (VHC).71 These VHC
substances then proceed to the Authorization stage.72
Passing the Authorization stage requires substitution of the VHC
substance with a safer alternative, proof that risks associated with the
63

REACH, supra note 3, art. 3(3) (defining “article” as “an object which during production
is given a special shape, surface or design which determines its function to a greater degree
than does its chemical composition”).
64 Id. intro. (15).
65
Id.
66 Lawrence A. Kogan, REACH Revisited: A Framework for Evaluating Whether a NonTariff Measure Has Matured Into an Actionable Non-Tariff Barrier to Trade, 28 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 489, 612–13 (2013).
67
David A. Wirth, The EU’s New Impact on U.S. Environmental Regulation, 31 FLETCHER
F. WORLD AFF. 91, 100 (2007).
68
Id. at 91, 100, 102–03 (explaining that REACH has already begun to infiltrate the U.S.
economy by influencing the actions of chemical manufacturers, and that harmonizing
regulatory systems can prevent a competition distortion in the marketplace).
69
REACH, supra note 3, at tit. VI, ch. 2, art. 44(2).
70
Id. tit. VI, ch. 2, art. 44, (1)(a)–(c).
71
See Conrad Benedetto, Is the European Laboratory Over-REACH-ing?
The
Experimentation, Reaction and Product Yielded by the European Union’s Registration,
Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 83 (2010).
72
Applegate, supra note 61, at 742.
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chemical are “adequately controlled,” or proof that the benefits of the VHC
substance outweigh its risks.73 The European Commission, the executive
arm of the EU, exerts jurisdiction over the Authorization stage.74 The
chemical may only enter the stream of commerce if the European
Commission finds justification for its sale notwithstanding its dangerous
properties.75 Accordingly, if the applicant cannot substitute the VHC
substance with an alternative substance or show that the chemical’s benefits
outweigh its risks, then the chemical is subject to restriction.76 The European
Commission and member states centrally implement restrictions, subjecting
the chemicals to a partial or total ban from the market.77
These provisions establish a comprehensive, stringent regulatory system
unlike any other in the world, which could fundamentally change global
chemical trade.78 REACH’s mandates are particularly relevant to the U.S.
for several interrelated reasons. First, the U.S. is the world’s top chemical
producer and exports substantial amounts of chemicals to the EU79 Second,
chemical trade primarily occurs through multinational corporations, making
the chemical industry a global industry.80 Further, because the regulatory
controls outlined in REACH do not match the regulatory controls of TSCA,
U.S. chemicals are not subjected to the same level of scrutiny as REACHregistered EU chemicals.81 In fact, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has evaluated only 2% of the sixty thousand pre-existing
chemicals since 1976.82 An additional twenty-two thousand new chemicals
have escaped testing for public or environmental safety under TSCA.83

73

REACH, supra note 3, at intro. (22); Applegate, supra note 61, at 742–43; Benedetto,
supra note 71, at 83.
74
Wirth, supra note 67, at 101.
75 REACH, supra note 3, at intro. (22).
76
Applegate, supra note 61, at 743.
77 REACH, supra note 3, at intro. (23); Applegate, supra note 61, at 742–43.
78
Paul E. Hagen, Product-Based Environmental Regulations: Europe Sets the Pace, 6
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y (2006) (“[I]n conditioning market access to adherence with
new product standards, the EU is . . . establishing global product standards, as few U.S.
companies can afford to ignore a potential consumer market that is now much larger than the
United States or even all of North America.”).
79 Benedetto, supra note 71, at 83; Applegate, supra note 54, at 767.
80
Applegate, supra note 54, at 767; Wirth, supra note 67, at 103.
81
Applegate, supra note 61, at 741 (stating that “it is hard to read [REACH’s legislative
history as] anything other than an effort to make REACH everything that TSCA was not”).
82
SIERRA CLUB, supra note 8, at 13.
83
Molly Rauch, 5 Ways the Outdated Toxic Chemicals Law Makes Us Sick, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 11, 2013, 6:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/molly-rauch/toxic-substancescontrol-act_b_4084879.html.

2015]

REACHING FOR HARMONY

739

Overall, 95% of chemicals have undergone little to no testing.”84 Therefore,
the EU can presumably ban importation of U.S. chemicals which have not
complied with the required Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization
phases of REACH, or that have already been restricted from the European
market.85 Therefore, trade tensions have surfaced because U.S. chemical
regulations do not meet EU standards.86 To better understand these
regulatory differences and their effect on the trade relationship between the
U.S. and EU, examining the general framework of TSCA in comparison to
REACH is also helpful.
B. TSCA
Mirroring its present-day instability, TSCA had a rocky start.87 In 1971,
as federal environmental legislation swept the nation, the Council on
Environmental Quality proposed toxic substances legislation aimed at
regulating chemicals from the cradle to the grave.88 After a five year delay,
environmental catastrophes, such as the contamination of the Hudson River,
finally prompted Congress to pass TSCA.89 Unfortunately, TSCA did not
live up to its creators’ expectations.90 Over the years, each branch of the
U.S. government has interfered with TSCA’s goal of widespread chemical
regulation.91 While TSCA had the potential to comprehensively regulate
chemicals and chemical manufacturing if strictly construed, it is now
84

Wirth, supra note 67, at 102.
See generally Kogan, supra note 66, at 586–87 (noting complaints by Japan and the U.S.
that REACH Title VIII could result in import restrictions).
86 See id. at 514 (stating that “at least thirty-four non-EU WTO Members have expressed
specific trade concerns about the EU REACH regulation” signifying widespread concern
throughout the international community).
87
See generally O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 43 (explaining that many of TSCA’s
shortcomings stemmed from successful lobbying efforts from the chemical industry).
88
LINDA-JO SCHIEROW, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31905, THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES
CONTROL ACT (TSCA): A SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 2 (Feb. 2,
2010), available at http://www.gmaonline.org/file-manager/Chemicals/TSCA.CRS_REPORT.
pdf (explaining that the purpose of TSCA was to “identify and control chemicals whose
manufacture, processing, distribution, use, and/or disposal was potentially dangerous and not
adequately regulated under other environmental statutes”).
89
Id. (attributing the legislative delay to “controversies over the scope of chemical
screening . . . costs, and [TSCA’s] relationship to other regulatory laws. . . .”).
90
See O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 47 (concluding that TSCA never accomplished its
supporters’ goals).
91
See Applegate, supra note 61, at 723 (stating that TSCA’s “highly compromised final
statutory text, hostile judicial interpretation, and often timid implementation” have led to the
EPA primarily relying on the chemical industry to regulate itself).
85
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toothless in comparison to REACH.92 According to James T. O’Reilly, one
of TSCA’s original negotiators, “TSCA has failed and left us with a mere
façade of effective environmental action.”93
1. TSCA’s Structure
TSCA consists of six Titles.94 Title I sets out the general procedural and
substantive requirements of the Act, while Titles II–VI cover asbestos, radon,
lead, formaldehyde, and environmental topics concerning schools.95 Titles
II–VI are limited in scope, allowing the EPA to only set standards to govern
usages of these chemicals in special circumstances.96 Thus, at the outset,
TSCA’s conservative structure and limiting language constrain the breadth of
chemical regulation in the U.S., especially in comparison to the broad scope
of REACH.97 Notwithstanding the limited application of Titles II–VI, Title I
contains more broadly applicable rules and standards for chemical
regulation.98
The general structure of Title I resembles REACH’s structure.99
Chemical producers must conduct tests on potentially dangerous
chemicals.100 After producers submit this information to the EPA, the
agency then funnels the information into a database called the “inventory” of
chemicals.101 After the testing and information-gathering period, the EPA
must regulate chemicals that it determines pose a risk to the environment.102
92

O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 43 (observing that despite its potential, TSCA is much weaker
than REACH).
93
Id.
94 See generally TSCA, supra note 12, §§ 2601–2692.
95
Id.; SCHIEROW, supra note 88, at 3 (outlining Titles II–VI).
96 See, e.g., SCHIEROW, supra note 88, at 3 (noting that Title II focuses on asbestos usage in
schools and sets requirements for asbestos contractors; Title III only guides the EPA to assist
states that choose to monitor and control radon; and Title IV’s scope is limited to lead-based
paint).
97
See generally O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 43 (suggesting that TSCA’s weak language
defeated its ambitious goals).
98 TSCA, supra note 12; see Applegate, supra note 61, at 725 (noting that TSCA was
structured to comprehensively regulate chemicals).
99 See Applegate, supra note 61, at 753 (“[T]he basic structure of TSCA represents an
integrated, comprehensive approach. The European Union seeks to accomplish essentially the
same goals with REACH.”).
100
See SCHIEROW, supra note 88, at 3 (explaining that if insufficient data exists to evaluate a
chemical’s safety, testing is required when the chemical’s production creates unreasonable
risks or could potentially be released into the environment in large quantities).
101
E.g., id. at 3, 5.
102
Id. at 5.
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2. TSCA in Action
Though the structure of Title I appears facially comprehensive and
stringent—setting forth a scheme of testing, information gathering, and
regulation of both old and new chemicals—TSCA has not significantly
curtailed dangerous chemical production and distribution.103 A number of
factors explain this failure. First, the testing requirements set out in TSCA
Section IV are conditional: manufacturers or producers must only test
existing chemicals if the chemicals pose an “unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment,” or if the chemicals are “produced in substantial
quantities” and the chemical “enters or may reasonably be anticipated to
enter the environment in substantial quantities,” or insufficient data prevents
the EPA from safely predicting its harmful effects.104 The problem is that
words like “substantial,” “significant,” and “unreasonable” are inherently
subjective, giving wide latitude to the interpreter.105 Amplifying the
problem, essentially all of TSCA’s substantive provisions are couched in the
undefined term “unreasonable.”106 Therefore, because most regulatory
provisions are not automatically compulsory and are partly dependent upon
the judgment of one individual (the EPA Administrator), some chemicals
may never even enter the first stage of regulation under TSCA.107
Notwithstanding these discrepancies, TSCA gives the EPA authority to
identify dangerous chemicals and gather information about their potential
environmental effects.108 TSCA Section IV(a)’s broad language grants the
EPA this authority in a wide range of circumstances.109 For example, if the
EPA Administrator finds that the manufacture, sale, or disposal of a chemical
presents an unreasonable risk, and the effects of the chemical are unknown or
uncertain, the EPA can regulate.110 Section IV also broadly sweeps

103 See O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 43 (“TSCA was floated with great ambitions, but it has
bombed with tepid results due to its flawed wording.”).
104
TSCA, supra note 12, § 2603(a).
105
See O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 43 (referencing the “obscure and inconsistent phrases”
that have contributed to TSCA’s ineffectiveness). But see Applegate, supra note 61, at 729
(suggesting that while the term “unreasonable risk” is undefined in TSCA, legislative history
and subsequent jurisprudence may guide interpretation of the term).
106
Applegate, supra note 61, at 728, 731 (postulating that Congress’s use of the term
“unreasonable” with no statutory definition was also meant to protect the chemical industry).
107
See generally TSCA, supra note 12, § 2603 (giving the EPA authority to promulgate
regulatory rules if the Administrator finds reason to do so).
108
SCHIEROW, supra note 88, at Summary.
109
TSCA, supra note 12, § 2603(a).
110
Id.
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chemicals into the regulation based upon both quality and quantity.111
Accordingly, the EPA may regulate chemicals that pose unreasonable risks
to the environment based on the chemical’s individual characteristics, as well
as chemicals produced in large quantities if their release into the environment
is likely.112
However, to determine whether regulation is necessary, the EPA must
acquire relevant information about the chemical’s qualities or the quantity of
chemicals produced.113 The EPA can require that manufacturers conduct
scientific tests to provide this information.114 TSCA section 4(b) provides
that companies that manufacture or possess potentially harmful chemicals
“shall be required to conduct tests and submit data.”115 If the EPA finds that
the chemical poses an unreasonable risk based on this data, the agency can
impose a broad range of regulations to minimize the chemical’s
environmental impact.116 However, the EPA must choose the least
burdensome regulatory option by balancing the benefits of the chemical,
including the economic benefits, with its potential harm.117 The inclusion of
language like “unreasonable risk” and “least burdensome alternatives”
indicates congressional acquiescence to the preferences of industry instead of
TSCA’s environmental objectives.118
Other TSCA provisions also seem deceptively comprehensive and
stringent; however, in their application, these provisions dwindle in
effectiveness.119 For example, Section 8 requires that producers report all
potentially dangerous chemicals to the EPA.120 Section 5 requires that
producers notify the EPA when producing any new chemicals or using
111

Id. § 2603(a)(1)(B)(i).
SCHIEROW, supra note 88, at 2.
113
See id. at 5 (describing TSCA Section 8 provisions requiring the EPA to gather
information and granting EPA authority to collect information from industry).
114
Id. at Summary.
115 TSCA, supra note 12, § 2603(b)(3)(B).
116
SCHIEROW, supra note 88, at Summary.
117
Id.
118
See O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 43 (arguing that TSCA never reached its environmental
goals due to industry lobbying, which allowed industry to “dodge the bullet”); see also
Applegate, supra note 61, at 730–31 (suggesting that the “unreasonable risk” standard
represents Congress’s desire to protect the chemical industry).
119
Applegate, supra note 61, at 732–33 (describing the shortcomings of §§ 4 and 8 and the
regulatory inadequacies created by the distinction between existing and new chemicals); see
O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 43–44 (describing “three failures” of TSCA, which include the
“weak and conditional” §§ 6 and 8 provisions on regulation and reporting, and the § 14 data
disclosure provision which effectively prevents EPA from releasing pertinent information
submitted by industry).
120
TSCA, supra note 12, § 2607(e).
112
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existing chemicals in new ways.121 However, the regulatory actions the EPA
can take after receiving this information are limited.122 Though Section 6
gives the EPA authority to limit or ban the production of dangerous
chemicals, the provision only authorizes the EPA to invoke “the least
burdensome regulatory approach, even in controlling unreasonable risks.”123
Just as Section 4’s subjective language creates uncertainty and can limit the
EPA’s regulatory authority, the “least burdensome” language of Section 6
takes even more enforcement power from the EPA’s ability to effectively
regulate chemicals.124
C. REACH/TSCA Similarities and Differences
Understanding the similarities and differences between TSCA and
REACH is critical for predicting the tenor of TTIP negotiations and the
possibility and difficulties of harmonization. Trade negotiators are well
aware of the incompatibility between U.S. and EU chemical regulations, so
an agreement to harmonize one or both of the systems to simplify trade is
conceivable.125
Because the imbalance between the U.S. and EU chemical regulatory
systems cuts against TTIP’s free trade goals, differences between TSCA and
REACH are most germane to the purposes of this Note. In fact, the
Europeans based many of REACH’s provisions on the observation of
TSCA’s failures.126 However, REACH still resembles TSCA in many basic,
structural ways.127

121

Id. § 2604(a).
See generally O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 44 (explaining that “[c]onstraints on the
operation of Sections 5 and 6 of the Act were heavily influenced by industry” and that the
1991 court ruling in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991),
“undercut the potency of TSCA” by requiring the EPA to defer chemical control to another
federal agency).
123
SCHIEROW, supra note 88, at 5.
124
See O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 44 (“Sections 6 and 8 of TSCA are weak and very
conditional.”).
125
See SIERRA CLUB, supra note 8, at 13–14 (“The USTR has expressed a number of
concerns over the EU’s REACH program, signaling that chemical regulatory differences will
be on the TTIP negotiating table.”); see also Bernabe-Riefkohl, supra note 7, at 212
(explaining that “countries have to ‘harmonize’ their laws to avoid obstructing free trade and
economic development, especially as they organize into economic alliances or transnational
trading blocs”).
126
Applegate, supra note 61, at 741.
127
See id. at 721 (explaining that REACH provisions mirror many of TSCA’s basic
regulatory approaches).
122
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1. Similarities
REACH and TSCA have several political, structural, and procedural
similarities.128 Both REACH and TSCA were enacted after government
acknowledgment that the environment was at risk due to insufficient data
about chemicals.129 REACH and TSCA share broad goals of comprehensive
chemical regulation.130 Additionally, both regulations arguably take a
moderate approach to chemical regulation by balancing the primary goals of
environmental protection and human safety with countervailing economic
interests.131 Further, TSCA and REACH each regulate chemicals directly at
the source, make initial chemical testing conditional, and make governmental
restrictions procedurally complex, often to benefit the chemical industry.132
2. Differences
The structural similarities and parallel goals of REACH and TSCA could
simplify the harmonization process, but crucial differences in the regulations
also create significant hurdles.133 First, as discussed above, REACH and
TSCA rest on different theoretical environmental principles.134 The U.S.
embraces a science-based “risk assessment” approach, whereas the EU relies
more upon the Precautionary Principle.135
Second, TSCA and REACH approach burden of proof issues
differently.136 In TSCA, this difference results in looser regulation and less
power for the EPA.137 While the burden to produce information showing a
new chemical’s safety initially falls on U.S. chemical manufacturers, the
128 See generally id. at 753–62 (describing various similarities between REACH and TSCA,
including the balancing of environmental and economic protection and the creation of more
data about chemicals).
129
Id. at 723.
130 Id.
131
Id. at 753–54.
132
See id. at 730–32, 746–47 (explaining the similarities between REACH and TSCA).
133
See generally Wirth, supra note 67, at 102–03 (discussing U.S. efforts to block REACH,
which could suggest U.S. reluctance to change TSCA provisions that are contrary to
REACH).
134 See Applegate, supra note 61, at 765 (proposing that TSCA reform will require the U.S.
to embrace of the Precautionary Principle).
135
See Benedetto, supra note 71, at 79 (highlighting the difference between U.S. and EU
chemical regulatory approaches by explaining that “[t]he European Parliament specifically
rejected the United States’ model of chemical regulation by adopting the precautionary
principle . . . preempt[ing] complete scientific proof of the harm of a chemical”).
136
Applegate, supra note 61, at 736–37.
137
Id.
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burden shifts to the EPA to prove, by a substantial evidence standard, that the
chemicals present an unreasonable risk to the environment or human
health.138 Because the EPA cannot compel manufacturers to provide extra
information or conduct additional research on the chemical, proving
unreasonable risk requires a wealth of information the EPA does not readily
possess.139 REACH, on the other hand, ultimately places the burden on the
chemical industry.140 Therefore, the ECHA can prove a chemical is too
dangerous for manufacture, sale, or distribution under a less stringent
standard.141 As a result, the EPA has less power to curb dangerous chemical
production in comparison to the ECHA.142
Another important difference is the regulations’ treatment of new and
existing chemicals. TSCA gives the EPA little power over chemicals that
existed before TSCA’s enactment, limiting EPA oversight on 99% of the
chemicals in commerce.143 However, new chemicals must undergo premanufacture notice, which requires manufacturers to present data regarding
new chemicals and new uses of existing chemicals.144 Conversely,
REACH’s provisions apply equally to new and existing chemicals, sweeping
all chemicals into the regulation.145 Only chemicals produced in quantities of
less than one ton per year escape regulation under REACH.146 While
REACH and TSCA exhibit some similarities, these differences suggest a
need for harmonization147 because having one uniform standard would make
chemical production more efficient.148

138

Id.
See id. at 735–36 (stating that “EPA must take what [information] it is given” because
TSCA’s pre-manufacture notice provision “does not require the creation of any new safety
data”).
140 See id. at 745–46.
141
See generally id. (explaining that under REACH, manufacturers bear a heavier burden
than the ECHA because “the party with the burden must move the status quo”).
142
See id. (comparing the EPA’s burden of proof which “clearly contributes to TSCA’s
ineffectiveness,” to REACH’s burden of proof).
143
Id. at 731–32.
144 Id. at 727.
145
Id. at 743–44.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 752–53 (noting that “TSCA is clearly overdue for reform” and that U.S. businesses
will have to comply with REACH to maintain access to the European market).
148
See Donahue, supra note 11, at 365 (explaining that differences in domestic
environmental standards can restrict international trade by raising the costs of international
business).
139
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V. REACH’S CONSISTENCY WITH INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
The previous sections argue that REACH is the superior environmental
response to chemical regulation. However, a holistic analysis of the REACH
program in the context of TTIP negotiations must also consider the
international economic impact of REACH.
Even under the normative assumption that REACH is a superior regime,
the United States currently does not have a direct incentive to change its
chemical regulatory system. Just because the Europeans choose a certain
level of human health and environmental protection does not automatically
suggest that other sovereign nations could or should enact similar policies.149
Nevertheless, both direct and indirect forces may bring sovereign nations’
laws closer together.150
A phenomenon referred to as “The California Effect” could indirectly
encourage and foster regulatory harmonization.151 The “California Effect”
occurs when one large market participant demands that certain standards be
met, and other markets acquiesce to those demands to obtain access to the
large market.152 For example, California, as the most populous state, is a
huge contributor to the U.S. economy with high environmental standards.153
Companies not based in California often alter their manufacturing methods
to meet California’s environmental standards and gain access to the huge
California market.154 As a matter of efficiency, these non-California
companies often apply the changes across the board because applying one
standard becomes cheaper than having multiple standards.155 Therefore,
149

But see Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The
Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 401, 407 (1995) (suggesting that
harmonization in the context of trade agreements and international economic integration is
crucial because “the establishment of a successful economic community . . . require[s]
harmonization of national laws”).
150 See id. at 402 (providing, through the example of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), that interaction between countries through free trade agreements can
foster harmonization of domestic laws).
151
Wirth, supra note 67, at 96–97 (describing the “California Effect”).
152 Id.
153
U.S. and World Population Clock, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 20, 2013),
http://www.census.gov/popclock/?intcmp=home_ pop; see also Patricia Weisselberg, Shaping
the Energy Future in the American West: Can California Curb Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Out-of-State, Coal-Fired Power Plants Without Violating the Dormant Commerce
Clause?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 185, 189 (2007) (“California has long recognized and accepted its
role as a leader in environmental regulation.”).
154
See Wirth, supra note 67, at 96–97 (outlining the typical decision making process that
results in companies acquiescing to California environmental standards).
155
Id.
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California’s higher environmental standards can inadvertently replace
weaker environmental standards in other states, simply because private
companies wish to access the large California market.156
However, the “California Effect” is not foolproof. In the U.S. context,
out-of-state entities may challenge stringent environmental laws as
unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause.157 In the international
context, governments may protest high environmental standards of other
WTO-member countries as nontariff barriers to trade if they believe those
standards result in discrimination between domestic and foreign products or
act as unnecessary obstacles to trade.158 As a result, the nation in question
should be ready to defend its environmental regulation under WTO
standards. Fortunately, REACH is consistent with WTO law. Therefore,
with or without TTIP negotiations, the U.S. should aspire to reform TSCA to
meet REACH-like environmental standards.159 However, the U.S. also has
the unique incentive to simplify and foster trade with the EU by harmonizing
U.S. chemical regulatory standards with REACH standards.160 While
simpler mechanisms are available which could achieve the same level of
trade,161 the U.S. can accomplish two goals at once with upward
harmonization.162 As advocated above, TTIP presents an unprecedented
opportunity for two economic giants to enhance environmental protection
through a free trade agreement, instead of placing the two fields in their
traditional opposition to one another.

156

Id.
Weisselberg, supra note 153, at 186 (describing the dormant commerce clause challenge
to California Senate Bill 1368, which aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in California
by restricting imports of electricity from out-of-state, coal-fired electric plants).
158 See Kogan, supra note 66, at 501 (explaining that “the EU has recognized that the
REACH’s length and complexity and the new legal obligations it imposes present real
compliance challenges for industries that have affected international trade in chemical
substance-based products . . .”).
159 See SIERRA CLUB, supra note 8, at 13–14 (describing shortcomings of TSCA in
comparison to REACH and advocating United States adoption of REACH-like standards).
160 See generally id. at 21 (“The public, the environment, and the economies of Europe and
the United States could potentially benefit from a trade pact that . . . encourages trade and
investment without sacrificing the health and safety of the public.”).
161
See Donahue, supra note 11, at 370 (describing the “equivalence model” of
harmonization which only requires acceptance of another nation’s standards, as opposed to
requiring substantive changes of the law).
162
See SIERRA CLUB, supra note 8, at 21 (suggesting that a trade agreement like TTIP can
potentially enhance environmental protection).
157
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A. TBT Agreement
Before the U.S. undertakes chemical regulatory reform, the U.S. must
ensure that any regulatory change would not violate GATT standards, which
bind the U.S. as a WTO member. The fact that no WTO member has
formally challenged REACH is a good indicator that REACH is not a blatant
violation of WTO rules.163 However, a legal challenge could arise in the
future, as many countries have expressed concerns about the regulation since
2006.164 The mandates of REACH, particularly the registration and datagathering requirements and potential total market bans, could create an
adverse impact on the economies of other countries wishing to sell chemicals
in the European market.165
If a dispute arises, purely political restraints could discourage the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) from attempting to invalidate provisions of
REACH.166 Much of the WTO’s institutional legitimacy hinges on allowing
its members to make domestic noneconomic policy without interference
from a politically unaccountable international organization.167 Therefore, the
WTO could compromise its international clout if it consistently ruled against
members’ important environmental policies in favor of trade.168 Because the
WTO’s institutional legitimacy depends upon sovereign member states’
163 Kogan, supra note 66, at 510–14 (outlining the reasons REACH has thus far been
deemed compliant with WTO standards: the EU notified the WTO and WTO members ahead
of time about the regulatory changes, facilitated notice-and-comment to WTO members on
REACH provisions, incorporated many of those comments, and engaged in bilateral
consultations with concerned countries).
164
See id. at 501 (stating that “as of November 10, 2011, thirty-four WTO Members had
expressed specific trade concerns about the EU REACH regulation.” Further, WTO
Secretariat report cited REACH concerns as “most frequently raised by the greatest number of
Members.”).
165
See id. at 514–15 (outlining various present complaints about REACH including
stringent registration requirements and potential discriminatory treatment).
166
See generally Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving
Beyond the Entropic Dilemma, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625, 651–52 (2005) (noting the WTO DSB’s
shift from examining the content of noneconomic regulations to focusing on the application of
the regulation after the former practice “infuriated domestic policymakers and thus diminished
their perception of GATT’s legitimacy”).
167 See Sidney A. Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection, and
Public Accountability, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 435, 450 (2002) (stating that the WTO is politically
unaccountable due to the lack of public participation and transparency in dispute resolution);
see generally Cho, supra note 166, at 673 (stating that “the mounting tension between trade
and [noneconomic] values [can] undermine the legitimacy of the global trading system”).
168
See generally Cho, supra note 166, at 626 (describing mass protests by environmentalists
at the Seattle Round that accused the WTO of placing economic concerns over environmental
protection).
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voluntary acquiescence to its authority,169 the WTO is likely to approach any
challenge to domestic environmental regulation prudently, including a
challenge to REACH.
While political restraints indirectly shape the interaction between
domestic environmental law and international trade law, the “Technical
Barriers to Trade” Agreement (TBT)170 provides a more direct, textual
analysis of the relationship. The TBT Agreement is an international
agreement supplementing GATT, which establishes rules and procedures
regarding the development, adoption, and application of mandatory technical
regulations and voluntary standards for products and the procedures (such as
testing or certification) for determining whether a particular product meets
such regulations or standards.171
The TBT Agreement governs a wide array of product regulations, which
can include labelling, safety, and recycling requirements, just to name a
few.172 One of the TBT Agreement’s main goals is to uphold WTO
members’ right to protect their environment, while preventing members from
using environmental regulations to inhibit trade.173 REACH involves
mandatory registration and information-gathering requirements directly
affecting chemicals and products containing chemical substances in the
interest of health and environmental protection.174 Therefore, if a challenge
to REACH arises, it will most naturally fit under the TBT Agreement.175
Because the TBT agreement attempts to balance the goals of trade
liberalization and promotion of members’ sovereign rights to regulate, the
WTO would find the regulation TBT-consistent if REACH has a legitimate
purpose and does not discriminatorily burden or unnecessarily restrict
international trade.176 Complaining members would then have to submit to
the regulation for access to the EU chemical market.177

169

See Joshua Meltzer, State Sovereignty and the Legitimacy of the WTO, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 693, 693 (2005) (explaining that state consent to joining the WTO and following
WTO rules creates much of the WTO’s legitimacy).
170 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT
Agreement].
171
Kogan, supra note 66, at 495.
172
TBT Agreement, supra note 170, at Annex 1.1.
173
Kogan, supra note 66, at 496.
174
REACH, supra note 3, art. 5; id. at intro. (19).
175
Kogan, supra note 66, at 495.
176
Id. at 496.
177
Id.
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A comprehensive TBT analysis is beyond the scope of this Note and has
been covered by other commentators.178 However, this discussion of
REACH’s consistency with the TBT outlines additional non-environmental
incentives for the U.S. to harmonize its standards with EU standards. First, if
REACH can withstand legal scrutiny at the WTO, then the U.S. will
ultimately have to submit to the EU law anyway.179 Furthermore,
harmonizing TSCA with REACH could streamline trade since the chemical
industry would only have to follow one standard.180 In this context,
harmonization would provide both environmental and economic benefits to
the U.S. For these reasons, REACH’s compliance with the TBT may be of
special interest to the U.S., especially in light of recent TTIP negotiations.
A TBT analysis of REACH would ultimately focus on two major issues.
The first issue is whether REACH engenders protectionism, meaning it
discriminates against foreign chemicals in order to unfairly benefit the EU’s
chemical industry.181 The second separate but related issue is whether
REACH is an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.182
As a threshold matter, the WTO DSB would determine whether REACH
is subject to the TBT Agreement.183 REACH would fall under the TBT
Agreement if the law is a technical regulation.184 Technical regulations are
documents mandating that an identifiable product (or group of products)
conforms to rules regarding the product’s intrinsic characteristics or productrelated characteristics.185 Examples of these types of rules include
requirements that products bearing certain labels be produced in an
environmentally responsible manner or not contain certain additives or
ingredients.186

178

Id. at 556–662.
See id. at 668 (reiterating that the WTO DSB will not rule against necessary,
nondiscriminatory regulations even if those measures restrict trade).
180
See Donahue, supra note 11, at 373 (demonstrating the economic benefit of
harmonization by describing efforts of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, a business group
consisting of U.S. and EU corporations, to eliminate U.S.–EU regulatory differences to
promote trade).
181 See Kogan, supra note 66, at 532 (describing the TBT discrimination analysis under
Article 2.1).
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Id. at 605 (describing the TBT trade-restrictiveness analysis under Article 2.2).
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Id. at 567–68 (describing the first step of a TBT analysis under Annex 1.1).
184
Id.
185
TBT Agreement, supra note 170, at Annex 1.1.
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See generally Kogan, supra note 66, at 524–66 (analyzing the contested TBT measures in
U.S.–COOL, U.S.–Clove Cigarettes, and U.S.–Tuna II).
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The second question, and first major issue, would be whether REACH is
“trade discriminatory.”187 Trade discrimination would occur if the EU used
REACH to treat chemicals produced outside the EU differently than similar
chemicals produced in an EU country.188 This kind of discrimination is
conceivable. For example, if a chemical produced predominately in the EU
passed the regulatory phases of REACH, while a “like” chemical (a non-EU
chemical containing similar physical properties, with similar end-uses and
tariff classifications, which is generally perceived and used similarly by
consumers) was deemed too dangerous for sale on the European market, a
country could bring and win a TBT claim.189
The third question, and second major issue, is whether REACH is an
“unnecessary obstacle to trade that is more trade-restrictive than necessary to
fulfill a legitimate objective.”190 This question is a related, but subsequent
inquiry to the discrimination analysis. This analysis focuses more upon the
competitive relationship between like products and the purpose of the
regulation itself, as opposed to focusing primarily on the products’
similarities.191 Here, the DSB would examine whether REACH’s purpose is
truly environmental protection or whether the EU had ulterior motives in
enacting the law.192 The DSB would look at REACH’s stated purposes,
whether REACH fulfills those purposes, and whether REACH unfairly alters
competition in the chemical marketplace.193
If less trade-restrictive
alternatives are available to the EU which would accomplish the same level
of environmental protection, then REACH would violate the TBT
Agreement.194
The TBT Agreement also requires that WTO members harmonize their
technical regulations with international standards by basing their domestic
rules on those international standards.195 However, if a WTO member
187

Id. at 530.
See id. at 532 (describing the “national treatment” obligation in Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement, which prohibits protectionist measures favoring domestic products over foreignproduced products).
189
See id. at 532, 570–71 (outlining the four elements of a “likeness” analysis under the
TBT Agreement and summarizing a likeness analysis of REACH-registered and non-REACH
registered chemicals and products containing chemicals).
190 Id. at 547.
191
Id. at 547–48.
192
See id. at 550 (stating that the DSB will look at “the regulation’s text as well as its
design, architecture, and structure” in determining its true purpose).
193
See id. at 549–55 (describing the “legitimate objective” analysis).
194
See generally id. at 557–88 (describing the WTO DSB’s analysis of potentially less trade
restrictive alternatives).
195
TBT Agreement, supra note 170, art. 2.4.
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desires to promulgate a technical regulation not based upon an international
standard, this standard may withstand scrutiny if the member transparently
enacts the technical regulation by notifying other WTO members.196 In this
instance the EU provided notification even before REACH’s enactment and
accepted and implemented changes from public comments.197 Whether
REACH strictly adheres to an international standard or not, these actions
support REACH’s legality under the TBT Agreement.198
As noted above, political pressure could compel WTO DSB deference to
the EU’s environmental policy preferences.199 More importantly, recent WTO
jurisprudence suggests that the DSB would likely defer to the EU’s policy
choices if a reasonable basis to restrict the chemicals from the market exists,
such as public health or environmental protection.200 For example, some
commentators have noted a “shift” in WTO jurisprudence regarding countries’
risk assessment analysis.201 Often, a product’s “risk”—which can affect
whether the product is “like” another product—is determined based on
quantitative risk assessment procedures.202 However, the WTO DSB is
increasingly recognizing qualitative risk assessment as sufficient to justify
trade-restrictive measures.203 This apparent shift indicates that the EU could
potentially succeed in a dispute by arguing that REACH-registered chemicals
and non-REACH-registered chemicals are not “like” if consumers prefer
REACH-registered
chemicals/products
over
non-REACH-registered
chemicals/products.204 While a definitive conclusion of REACH’s TBT
legality would be premature at this time, recent trends and political factors
indicate that REACH is likely to withstand scrutiny under WTO law.
196
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198
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199 See supra text accompanying notes 166–69.
200
See Kogan, supra note 66, at 582 (suggesting that the WTO would recognize the EU’s
product distinctions between REACH-registered products and non-registered products).
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See id. at 578–82 (discussing the WTO’s shift from requiring quantitative risk assessment
to recognizing qualitative risk assessment in SPS Agreement disputes, which suggests that
qualitative risk assessment will be sufficient for justifying measures under the less stringent
TBT Agreement).
202
See id. at 575–76 (describing the unsuccessful argument by Canada in EC–Asbestos that
quantitative risk assessment is the proper method of evaluating a product’s risk).
203
See id. at 576 (noting the WTO Appellate Body’s statement in the EC–Asbestos case that
“[a] risk may be evaluated either in quantitative or qualitative terms”).
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See id. at 611–12 (stating that recent jurisprudence “appear[s] to confirm in the TBT
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B. Harmonization
Assuming that REACH is legal under the TBT Agreement, the next
question is whether to harmonize U.S. chemical regulations with REACH at
all, and if so, how to harmonize. As noted before, harmonization would be
in the United States’ best interest from an environmental perspective because
TSCA regulates chemicals poorly.205 In addition to the environmental angle,
the United States could also further TTIP’s free trade goals by aligning its
standards with REACH standards.206 Despite the potential environmental
and trade benefits, harmonization is politically difficult.207 Implementing
new and different standards is also challenging on a practical level.208
Multiple types of harmonization and methods of implementation exist.209
The two basic types of harmonization are “full” harmonization and
“equivalence” harmonization.210 Full harmonization occurs when countries
adjust their regulations until they are the same.211
Equivalence
harmonization occurs when countries make no substantive changes in the
law, only agreeing that one standard is substitutable for the other standard.212
This Note calls for full harmonization, but full harmonization may go three
ways: up, down, or a compromise in the middle.213
Full upward harmonization occurs when a country with lower
environmental standards raises them to match another country’s higher
environmental standards.214 For example, if the U.S. changes TSCA to
match REACH, full upward harmonization will occur. Full downward
harmonization occurs when a country with high environmental standards
lowers them to match a country with lower standards.215 If the EU changed
205
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REACH to match TSCA, full downward harmonization would occur.
Intermediate harmonization occurs when each country compromises to create
a completely new standard.216 If the United States and the EU negotiate a
totally new standard to eliminate regulatory differences, they will be
engaging in intermediate harmonization. A fourth, but less environmentally
desirable option is equivalent harmonization.217 The EU could simply agree
to accept TSCA standards as equal to REACH standards by signing an
equivalency agreement.218
While this Note suggests full upward harmonization, history suggests the
U.S. and EU are likely to opt for the fourth option—equivalent
harmonization.219 In 1997, the U.S. and the EU signed the Mutual
Recognition Agreement (MRA), which is an equivalence agreement
governing six product sectors.220
Significantly, the U.S.-EC MRA
establishes that the U.S. and EU will accept one another’s procedural
standards as equivalent, while their substantive domestic standards will
remain unchanged.221
The nature of the agreement could implicate REACH in the following
ways. First, the chemical sector is not covered under the U.S.-EC MRA, so
REACH-TSCA harmonization is not automatically subject to the MRA’s
equivalency standard.222 Second, however, the U.S. and EU could amend the
MRA to include the chemical sector.223 Nevertheless, even if the nations add
chemicals as a sector to the MRA harmonization agreement, REACH would
not be implicated unless it is purely a procedural regulation.224 Negotiators
could reasonably construe REACH as a procedural regulation since the core
of the regulation focuses on registration and information-gathering.225
216
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219 Id. at 373 (“[P]rofessional harmonizers of the European Union have worked closely with
U.S. trade officials since the late 1980s to develop equivalence as the main method of
harmonization between the two.”).
220
Id. at 379.
221 Id. at 379–80.
222
See id. at 379 (noting that the U.S.-EC MRA covers “telecommunications equipment,
electromagnetic compatibility, electrical safety, recreational craft, pharmaceutical good
manufacturing practices, and medical devices”).
223
Id. at 382 (noting that a business interest group has lobbied to add chemical products as a
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However, if REACH’s registration and testing requirements affect consumer
tastes and habits, thereby altering the competitive nature of the chemical
products, then REACH could more readily be seen as regulating the sale of
safe vs non-safe chemicals and chemical products.226 Therefore, negotiators
could also portray REACH as a substantive regulation not covered by the
MRA.227
Whether or not the U.S.-EC MRA could ultimately solve the
harmonization problem between TSCA and REACH, past negotiating
practices suggest that the two nations use the equivalency method to achieve
regulatory harmonization.228 Even if the U.S. and EU were to decide against
specifically using the MRA to bridge the chemical regulatory gap, they could
negotiate a similarly structured agreement specifically for TTIP.
Alternatively, they could include within TTIP a side agreement declaring that
the EU accepts U.S. standards as equivalent with REACH standards.
Similarly, TTIP negotiators could agree to establish a dispute resolution
system specifically for TTIP, in which environmental disputes would be
solved without fusing environmental standards. While these methods of
equivalent harmonization could successfully liberalize the chemical trade by
functionally eliminating regulatory trade barriers, full upward harmonization
would achieve the same economic goals, while also enhancing U.S.
environmental and health protection.229
Though equivalent harmonization is admittedly the easier, more
politically viable option,230 full upward harmonization is preferable and
possible. The EU already confirmed that it will not compromise its
environmental/health standards for TTIP.231
Relying on equivalence
harmonization of REACH and TSCA would compromise the environmental
goals of REACH.232 If TSCA’s standards were declared an adequate
substitute, EU importers would no longer be required to register U.S.
chemicals, meaning these chemicals would not be subject to REACH’s
226
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regulations to equivalent harmonization).
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further evaluation and testing requirements.233 Since the vast majority of
U.S. chemicals escape the EPA’s scrutiny and the U.S. is a major chemical
exporter, equivalent harmonization would not satisfy REACH’s health and
environmental protection requirements.234 Further, the EU is accustomed to
aiming for and achieving upward harmonization within its own borders.235
Therefore, the EU is probably optimistic about full upward harmonization.
In the WTO context, the TBT Agreement requires harmonization with
international standards, and also contemplates harmonization between
countries in TBT Article 2.7.236 While Article 2.7 suggests countries engage
in equivalence harmonization, the language does not affirmatively restrict
full upward harmonization.237 Furthermore, as discussed above, WTO
membership does not directly curb the United States’ right to adopt and
change its own domestic policies.238
Finally, while full upward
harmonization is generally the most challenging harmonization technique, it
is more feasible between similarly developed governments like the U.S. and
EU239 Though the EU is often perceived as having comparatively higher
environmental standards,240 the United States also aspires to employ high
environmental standards, so harmonization in this area is politically and
technically possible.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States and the European Union have a unique opportunity to
meet two equally important goals through TTIP. First and foremost, TTIP is
a bilateral trade agreement that can enhance and ease economic interactions
between two huge economies, thereby improving standards of living for
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Donahue, supra note 11, at 384; Press Release, Office of the United States Trade
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advanced” economies).
240
See Wirth, supra note 67, at 91 (stating that Europe has tightened its environmental
regulations while the United States has deregulated in recent years).
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United States and European Union citizens.241 Second, TTIP could also
serve as a tool to effectuate other legitimate goals, including better
environmental protection.242 Further, using TTIP as a tool to achieve more
comprehensive chemical regulation in the world’s two largest economies
could prompt a “California Effect” in which other nations would voluntarily
adjust their chemical regulatory standards to meet those of the European
Union and the United States to gain access to their markets. This type of
economic and environmental cooperation could shift the way the
international community views the interaction between trade and the
environment and, hopefully, open the door to further international
environmental cooperation in the future.243 While TTIP’s economic goals
can be accomplished through simpler means such as equivalence
harmonization, the better option is for the United States to fully harmonize
upward, creating freer trade flows between the two nations while also better
protecting the U.S. environment.244
Full upward harmonization between REACH and TSCA is an ambitious,
but needed undertaking. As stated by the USTR, “[t]he challenges posed by
efforts to improve regulatory cooperation between the European Union and
the United States should not be underestimated. But there are reasons to be
optimistic.”245
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